Global Affairs Session 92 11 September 2026

ANSAR ALLAH VS SAUDI

Gulf equations rapidly changing

Yemen unified in 1990, but years of rivalry, civil war, outside intervention and regional competition have left it divided and fragile. By September 2026, Ansar Allah’s west-coast advances, Saudi energy-route vulnerabilities, Iran’s strategic support, UAE-linked networks and the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement have placed Yemen inside a wider Gulf security equation.

Summary

Yemen unified in 1990, merging North and South, but political rivalry soon produced a failed southern secession in 1994.

Ali Abdullah Saleh dominated politics until the 2011 Arab Spring uprising forced his resignation. The Houthi movement seized Sana’a in 2014, triggering civil war and a Saudi-led intervention in 2015.

Years of conflict fragmented the country, empowered southern separatists, devastated the economy, and deepened humanitarian suffering.

By September 2026, Yemen remained divided, fragile, and regionally contested, and 3 major groups are fighting inside. Many more are intervening from the outside.

Brief history of Yemen

1. Unification of Yemen (1990) North Yemen and South Yemen formally merged in May 1990, creating the Republic of Yemen under President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had previously ruled North Yemen.
2. North–South tensions and the 1994 civil war Political, military and economic tensions quickly emerged between northern and southern leaders. In 1994, southern leaders attempted to break away, but Saleh’s northern forces defeated the secessionist movement and restored central control.
3. Saleh’s long rule and the Arab Spring (2011) Saleh remained Yemen’s dominant leader for more than two decades, but protests inspired by the Arab Spring erupted in 2011. Growing unrest and international pressure eventually forced him to transfer power.
4. Hadi takes power and the transition struggles Vice-President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi became president in 2012. His government faced weak institutions, economic problems, southern separatism, al-Qaeda activity and the growing strength of the Houthi movement in northern Yemen.
5. Houthis capture Sana’a (2014) The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, expanded from their northern stronghold in Saada and seized the capital Sana’a in September 2014. Hadi was eventually forced to flee the capital and later operated from southern Yemen and abroad.
6. Saudi- and UAE-backed intervention (2015 onward) In March 2015, Saudi Arabia led a military coalition supporting Hadi’s internationally recognised government against the Houthis. The UAE also intervened but increasingly supported southern armed groups and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which favoured greater southern autonomy or independence.
7. A deeply divided Yemen by 2026 Years of war devastated infrastructure, weakened state institutions, disrupted trade and oil revenues and produced a severe humanitarian crisis. By September 2026, the Houthis controlled much of northern and western Yemen, including Sana’a, while the south and east remained divided among rival anti-Houthi authorities, local forces and southern separatists.

Who controls what in Yemen now

1. Yemen's territorial control is divided among several key factions, each maintaining distinct regional strongholds following years of complex conflict.
2. Houthis (Ansar Allah): Maintain a firm grip on the densely populated northwestern highlands. This territory includes the capital, Sana'a, and critical Red Sea port cities such as Al Hudaydah.
3. Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) & Government Allies: The internationally recognized government coalition holds the expansive, resource-rich eastern and central governorates, primarily Hadramawt and Al Mahrah, maintaining a significant presence in cities like Al Mukalla.
4. Southern Transitional Council (STC): Operating with a southern secessionist agenda (while nominally allied with the PLC against the Houthis), the STC controls the strategic southern port city of Aden, neighboring southern governorates, and the remote island archipelago of Socotra.
5. Contested Frontlines: The boundaries separating these major factions feature shifting and mixed control. Key active battlegrounds and divided zones heavily feature the areas around Marib (a crucial energy hub), the long-besieged city of Taiz, and parts of Al Jawf and Al Bayda.

Axis of Resistance versus Axis of ‘Evil’

1. Iran’s “axis of resistance” is a network of allied armed groups and governments, including Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi militias, opposing Israel and US influence in the Middle East.
2. Iran sometimes uses “axis of evil” rhetorically for the United States, Israel and their regional allies, portraying them as forces driving war, sanctions and instability in the Middle East.
3. Axis of Resistance = Iran + Hezbollah + Houthis + Iraqi militias + Hamas + PIJ.
4. [ Iran; Hezbollah (Lebanon); Houthis/Ansar Allah (Yemen); Iran-aligned Iraqi militias/PMF factions such as Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat al-Nujaba and Badr; Hamas; Palestinian Islamic Jihad; Afghan Fatemiyoun and Pakistani Zainabiyoun militias. Assad’s Syria was formerly a key member until the regime fell in 2024 ]
5. Iran’s main opposing axis = Axis of ‘Evil’ = US + Israel + US-aligned regional partners.
6. [Primarily United States and Israel; depending on context, Iran also portrays Saudi Arabia and other US-aligned Gulf governments as opponents, but there is no fixed official Iranian “Axis of Evil” membership list ]
7. Original ‘Axis of Evil’ name by George W. Bush, 2002 - Iran, Iraq and North Korea. This was an American, not Iranian, designation.

Who plays what role inside Yemen

1. Saudi Arabia mainly backs Yemen’s internationally recognised government and now funds both civilian and military salaries to keep the state functioning and limit Houthi influence.
2. The UAE historically supported southern groups such as the STC, Giants Brigades, Shabwa Defence Forces and Hadrami Elite Forces, especially through salaries, weapons and training.
3. Iran backs the Houthis with weapons, missile and drone technology, funding, training and strategic support.
4. The Houthis, who control Sana’a and much of northern Yemen, also raise money through taxes, customs and port revenues while seeking wider salary support and political recognition.
5. The key difference is that Saudi Arabia wants a relatively unified and stable Yemen, the UAE has focused more on influence in the south and along strategic ports, and Iran wants a strong Houthi ally that can pressure its regional rivals.
6. Since early 2026, Saudi Arabia has become even more dominant in the anti-Houthi camp by taking over the salaries of some forces that were previously funded by the UAE.

Ansar Allah (Houthis)

1. Origins: The Houthis, officially Ansar Allah, grew out of a Zaydi Shia revival movement in northern Yemen, especially Saada, in the 1990s. Hussein al-Houthi became its early leader, and after his death in 2004 the movement turned into a sustained insurgency.
2. Main goal inside Yemen: To preserve and expand their political and military power, prevent a Saudi-backed order from dominating Yemen, and secure a decisive role in shaping the Yemeni state.
3. Regional position: Ansar Allah is Iran-aligned, but it is not simply an Iranian creation. Iran has provided weapons, funding and advice, while the Houthis retain their own Yemeni leadership and agenda. They are now not a proxy of Iran.
4. Where they stand today: As of September 11, 2026, they control Sana’a and much of populous northern Yemen, and have made major west-coast gains including Mocha, Dhubab and Perim/Mayun Island, giving them much greater leverage over Bab el-Mandeb.
5. What happens now: The key question is whether Saudi-backed Yemeni forces can reverse those gains or whether the Houthis consolidate them. If they hold the west coast and Bab el-Mandeb positions, their bargaining power over Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Red Sea shipping rises sharply.

Deeper Yemen politics

1. Population and size dynamics: The total citizen population of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain and Oman combined is approx. 2.7 crores, smaller than the population of Yemen, which is 4.3 crore plus. (that's 1.6 times) {Including expatriates, the six GCC states had about 6.15 crore residents in 2024}
2. Worries of monarchs: Gulf monarchs always worry that a unified Yemen is a huge strategic threat to them. So Yemen must either (i) remain under Gulf influence, especially Saudi influence, or (ii) be under the American umbrella like the Gulf states themselves. But it must not be a free, sovereign nation.
3. Saleh and after him: After Abdullah Saleh, Yemen entered a period of political turmoil and Islah gained influence. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE turned against Islah as part of their war against the Arab Spring. Islah lost to the Houthis, who took control of Sanaa in 2014.
4. Story of Islah: Islah, Yemen’s Sunni Islamist party, combines tribal, conservative and Muslim Brotherhood-linked currents. It opposes the Houthis and has often cooperated with Saudi Arabia, though Riyadh remains cautious about its Brotherhood ties. The UAE is far more hostile to Islah and has backed southern and other forces that seek to curb its influence.
5. KSA and UAE dive in: After getting rid of Islah's control of the capital Sanaa, Saudi Arabia and the UAE created and sponsored many factions in Yemen to fight the Houthis, who received Iranian support. The factions in southern Yemen (Giants Brigades) received Emirati support, while the rest (Nation's Shield, Yemen Emergency Forces in Saada and al-Jawf and Hadrami tribal forces) received Saudi funding.
6. What they did in Yemen: Saudi and Emirati support was divided into two main parts: (i) Buying the loyalty of tribal leaders with money, and (ii) paying salaries to Yemenis fighting in their factions against the Houthis
7. Difference with Iran: Unlike Iran, which provided military aid to its Houthi allies, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE intervened directly and wanted Yemeni allies to follow their orders, instead of letting Yemenis decide for themselves.
8. Breaking up with each other: And finally, the UAE interests clashed with those of its ally, Saudi Arabia. The UAE sought to revive the North-South conflict Via the STC so that instead of one strong Yemen, there would be two - North and South.
9. What Israel wants: This is also an Israeli objective, as similar attempts were in Syria (a state for the Kurds and another for the Druze), so that Israel could fight smaller entities if needed.
10. Beware Saudis: But Saudi Arabia may be the next target for partition after Yemen, because compared with the other Gulf states and Israel, Saudi Arabia has a larger population and a much larger territory! This has accelerated the Saudi-Emirati conflict (the UAE is expelled from Yemen).

Sectarian groups across Middle-East

1. The Middle East encompasses a diverse demographic of religious and sectarian groups, categorized by their distinct traditions, geographic centers, and leadership.
2. Sunni Muslims form the largest Muslim community in the region, with major populations in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye, Jordan, Syria, and the Gulf states.
3. Shia Islam is represented by three primary branches: (i) Twelver Shia (primarily in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon), (ii) Zaydi Shia (concentrated in northern Yemen), and (iii) Ismaili Shia.
4. Other distinct Islamic and esoteric traditions include Ibadi Muslims in Oman, Alawites in Syria's coastal belt, and the Druze community across Lebanon, Syria, and Israel.
5. Significant non-Muslim communities are integral to the region, notably Coptic Orthodox Christians in Egypt, Maronite Christians in Lebanon, and Jewish populations concentrated in Israel.
6. Each major community maintains specific regional centers of influence, distinct religious lineages, and recognized historical or contemporary leadership figures.

September 2026, the battlefield moves again

1. September 3: A major escalation began across western Taiz and Yemen's Red Sea coast. UNFPA reported that nearly 40,000 people had been displaced by September 7.
2. September 7: Houthi media released video showing burning trucks near the Al-Wadiah Saudi-Yemen border crossing.
3. September 8: Houthi missiles and drones struck Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran. Saudi authorities said 73 people were wounded and fires disrupted energy facilities. Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said the operation included Saudi energy and military targets.
4. September 9: Saudi authorities reported a second day of ballistic missile and drone attacks against Khamis Mushait, Abha and Jazan. Coalition spokesman Major General Turki al-Malki said Saudi Arabia would respond under its right of self-defence.
5. September 10: Ansar Allah captured Mocha after National Resistance forces led by Tareq Saleh withdrew or repositioned. Houthi forces also pressed toward the Hanish Islands, while government forces moved south toward Dhubab, opposite Perim Island. This is the decisive new geographical development.
6. The offensive received direct guidance and weapons support from Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Iranian officials continue to deny that Tehran controls the Houthis, so Iranian support and Iranian command should not be treated as identical claims.

Hormuz plus Bab el-Mandeb equals a Saudi energy dilemma

1. The current Gulf crisis has reduced the reliability of the Strait of Hormuz, historically the principal maritime exit for Gulf energy exports. EIA estimates oil and petroleum-liquid flows fell from 21.6 million barrels per day in Q4 2025 to 4.9 million in Q2 2026.
2. Saudi Arabia's great strategic advantage is the East-West Pipeline, roughly 1,200 km across the kingdom to the Red Sea. Saudi Aramco says it reached its maximum crude capacity of 7 million barrels per day in 2026, including roughly 2 million barrels per day feeding refineries.
3. The pipeline feeds the Yanbu system on Saudi Arabia's west coast and allows Saudi crude to bypass Hormuz. This became critical after the February 2026 Iran war disrupted Gulf shipping.
4. EIA estimates flows through Bab el-Mandeb rose from 5.4 million barrels per day in Q4 2025 to 8.1 million in Q2 2026, partly because Saudi Arabia rerouted crude westward through Yanbu.
5. But Yanbu does not create a single dependency on Bab el-Mandeb. Europe-bound cargo can move north through the Red Sea toward Suez or SUMED. Asia-bound cargo loaded at Yanbu generally moves south and therefore depends on Bab el-Mandeb.
6. Therefore, the strategic danger is not that taking Mocha automatically blocks Saudi exports. The danger is that further Houthi advances toward Dhubab and Perim, combined with missiles, drones and anti-shipping operations, could make Saudi Arabia's main Hormuz bypass (alternative) substantially riskier.

Makkah JDA and the new Gulf security equation

1. August 7, 2026: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the Makkah Agreement for Joint Defence.
2. The agreement states that an armed attack against any one of the three states is to be regarded as an attack against all three, creating a formal collective-deterrence commitment.
3. August 31: Foreign ministers, defence ministers and military chiefs met in Istanbul. They agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially led by a Pakistani secretary-general for three years, and expand defence-industrial and military cooperation.
4. September 9: Pakistan conveyed a Saudi warning to Iran urging Tehran to restrain the Houthis. Iran denies that it exercises direct control over Ansar Allah.
5. September 10: Pakistan said no military response under the Makkah pact had been discussed following the Houthi attacks. The pact therefore creates deterrence, but it should not be described as automatically activated by every attack.
6. September 11: Saudi Crown Prince MbS asked President Donald Trump for US strikes on the Houthis and Trump declined. CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper travelled to Saudi Arabia for urgent coordination, showing that Riyadh is assembling several security layers rather than relying on one alliance.

Conclusion

Yemen can no longer be treated as an isolated civil war

Mocha, Dhubab, Perim, Hanish, Yanbu and Hormuz now sit inside one connected security equation. Ansar Allah has gained territorial leverage, but it does not yet fully control Bab el-Mandeb. Saudi Arabia has more export flexibility than most Gulf producers, yet every alternative route has vulnerabilities.

The UAE remains influential through Yemeni networks despite its military withdrawal, while Iran’s relationship with the Houthis has become strategically more consequential.

Makkah’s new defence framework adds deterrence, but its response to an

actual crisis remains deliberately uncertain.

Value addition

Glossary and related terms

Ansar Allah

The official name of the Houthi movement, rooted in northern Yemen’s Zaydi Shia revival movement.

Houthis

The common name for Ansar Allah, the force controlling Sana’a and much of northern and western Yemen in this session.

Zaydi Shia

A branch of Shia Islam concentrated in northern Yemen and central to the origins of the Houthi movement.

Yemen unification

The 1990 merger of North Yemen and South Yemen into the Republic of Yemen.

Sana’a

Yemen’s constitutional capital, controlled by the Houthis since 2014.

Aden

A major southern port city and temporary seat of Yemen’s internationally recognised leadership.

Presidential Leadership Council

The internationally recognised government coalition referred to in the session as holding large eastern and central areas with allies.

Southern Transitional Council

A southern secessionist force historically backed by the UAE and linked to Aden and southern Yemen.

Islah

Yemen’s Sunni Islamist party, combining tribal, conservative and Muslim Brotherhood-linked currents.

Axis of Resistance

Iran’s network of aligned groups and governments including Hezbollah, Ansar Allah, Iraqi militias, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Axis of Evil

Originally a 2002 U.S. term; in this session also used as Iran’s rhetorical label for the U.S., Israel and aligned regional partners.

Bab el-Mandeb

The strategic strait between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, central to Red Sea shipping and Saudi energy-route concerns.

Strait of Hormuz

The principal maritime exit for Gulf energy exports and a major energy chokepoint.

Mocha

A Red Sea port city whose reported capture by Ansar Allah in September 2026 is treated as a decisive development.

Dhubab

A coastal area near Bab el-Mandeb highlighted as important for Red Sea security.

Perim / Mayyun Island

An island near Bab el-Mandeb whose control matters for maritime leverage.

Hanish Islands

Red Sea islands mentioned as a direction of Houthi pressure during the September 2026 battlefield shift.

Yanbu

Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea oil hub connected to the East-West Pipeline.

East-West Pipeline

Saudi Arabia’s pipeline across the kingdom to the Red Sea, presented as a major Hormuz bypass route.

SUMED

The Suez-Mediterranean route referenced as part of the northbound Europe path from the Red Sea.

Maritime chokepoint

A narrow sea passage where disruption can affect trade, energy flows and regional security.

Makkah Agreement for Joint Defence

The Saudi-Türkiye-Pakistan defence framework described as creating collective deterrence without automatic activation for every attack.

Collective deterrence

A security commitment intended to warn adversaries that an attack on one partner may trigger broader consequences.

CENTCOM

United States Central Command, mentioned through urgent coordination with Saudi Arabia during the crisis.

Red Sea shipping

The commercial and energy traffic corridor affected by Houthi missiles, drones, sea mines, maritime-drone sites and coastal gains.