Global Affairs Session 94 15 September 2026

NEW MIDDLE-EAST RISING

From Blocs to Networks

By September 2026, the Middle East is no longer organised mainly through fixed blocs and an American security umbrella. Its power map is being redrawn by chokepoints, missiles and drones, armed networks, economic vulnerability and overlapping partnerships. Donald Trump’s US remains militarily central, but Mohammed bin Salman, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, King Abdullah II and Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani are pursuing more autonomous strategies. Iran has a new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei; Syria has a new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa; and the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement links Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan. A more layered, multi-aligned regional order is emerging.

Summary

By September 2026, the Middle East is no longer organised mainly through fixed blocs and an American security umbrella.

Its power map is being redrawn by chokepoints, missiles and drones, armed networks, economic vulnerability and overlapping partnerships.

Donald Trump’s US remains militarily central, but Mohammed bin Salman, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, King Abdullah II and Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani are pursuing more autonomous strategies. Iran has a new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei; Syria has a new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa; and the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement links Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan.

A more layered, multi-aligned regional order is emerging.

The old order is dying

1. For decades, Middle Eastern security was organised largely around (i) sovereign states, (ii) relatively fixed camps and (iii) an American military umbrella protecting key regional partners.
2. That structure has not disappeared, but President Donald Trump’s US now operates inside a region where local powers increasingly pursue their own security arrangements and diplomatic strategies.
3. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Jordan’s King Abdullah II and Qatar’s Amir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani are increasingly important independent agenda-setters.
4. Iran War and Ansar Allah resurgence showed how missiles, drones, armed movements, maritime disruption, energy infrastructure and tech capabilities now shape new power.
5. Geography itself has changed in importance: Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, Gaza and southern Syria have become central theatres connecting local conflict with global trade and security.
6. The argument of this session is therefore not that states are disappearing, but that the state-and-alliance system that once explained the Middle East is no longer sufficient to explain how power works.

From capitals to chokepoints

1. On 12 September 2026, a drone attack forced Saudi Arabia temporarily to shut its crucial East-West oil pipeline, an infrastructure route designed to move oil toward the Red Sea while reducing dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.
2. At the same time, Houthi advances along Yemen’s Red Sea coast brought renewed fighting toward the Bab el-Mandeb, including strategically important coastal and island positions.
3. By 15 September, renewed fighting in Yemen had displaced more than 100,000 people, showing the human consequences of this strategic struggle.
4. On 15 September, Mohammed bin Salman and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi explicitly discussed the security of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea together, revealing how these waterways are becoming one connected strategic system.
5. Egypt consequently matters not merely because it is a large Arab state, but because President Sisi controls the state sitting at the northern gateway of the Suez–Red Sea maritime corridor.
6. The new geography of power is therefore increasingly about who can protect, threaten, bypass or negotiate access to the arteries through which energy and world trade move.

Iran changed the grammar of power

1. Iran itself entered a new political era in 2026: Mojtaba Khamenei became Supreme Leader in March after the death of his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while Masoud Pezeshkian remains president.
2. The Iran conflict has also moved beyond traditional proxy confrontation: since February 2026, U.S. forces have conducted extensive air and naval operations against Iranian military targets, while Iran has retaliated against U.S. forces and interests across the region.
3. Iran’s regional influence nevertheless continues to work partly through relationships with armed actors, like the Ansar Allah (Houthis) in Yemen, rather than solely through conventional Iranian forces.
4. Asymmetric warfare has redefined warfare. The combination of missiles, drones and relatively inexpensive unmanned systems allows states and armed movements to threaten expensive military installations, energy facilities and commercial shipping.
5. Gulf governments therefore face a dual requirement: strengthen air and missile defence while simultaneously keeping diplomatic channels with Tehran available.
6. Iran’s importance to the new Middle East lies in this transformation: regional power can now be projected across borders without permanently occupying the territory being influenced.

Gaza still sits at the centre

1. Benjamin Netanyahu remains Israel’s prime minister, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to shape regional politics despite the ceasefire framework established in 2025.
2. Israeli strikes continued in Gaza in September 2026, demonstrating that a ceasefire framework has not produced a final political settlement or complete cessation of violence.
3. The conflict is also part of a wider Israeli security theatre: Israel continued military operations against Hezbollah infrastructure in Lebanon while tensions involving Syrian territory remained active.
4. Gaza diplomacy increasingly demonstrates the new multipolar region: Erdoğan’s Türkiye, Sisi’s Egypt and Sheikh Tamim’s Qatar have all operated as important mediating states.
5. Egypt and Saudi Arabia continue publicly to support a settlement based on the two-state principle, while Jordan also treats the Palestinian issue as fundamental to long-term regional stability.
6. Palestine therefore remains much more than one conflict among many: it is still a central test of Arab diplomacy, Israeli security doctrine, American influence and regional political legitimacy.

Northern arc is reopening

1. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Türkiye is becoming one of the principal external powers shaping Syria’s post-war political, security and economic environment.
2. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Damascus on 13–14 September 2026, reinforcing Ankara’s direct engagement with the new Syrian order.
3. Syria itself has undergone a historic leadership transformation: President Ahmed al-Sharaa now heads a state attempting to move from prolonged civil war toward reconstruction and renewed regional relations. But Syria is witnessing huge public discontent right now.
4. On 9 September, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi met Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus, while Jordan under King Abdullah II has backed Syrian reconstruction, sovereignty and territorial unity.
5. Jordan occupies an increasingly difficult strategic position: it has condemned Israeli incursions into Syrian territory while also reporting recent Iranian missile attacks affecting Jordanian security.
6. Turkey, Syria and Jordan therefore form a critical new northern arc where border security, reconstruction, trade, water, Kurdish questions, Israeli security and wider regional competition now intersect.

Cairo and Riyadh return to the centre

1. On 15 September 2026, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman in Egypt amid rapidly escalating regional tensions.
2. Sisi explicitly reaffirmed that the security of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states forms part of Egypt’s national security, a significant statement about the emerging Arab security framework.
3. The two leaders placed the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea within the same discussion about freedom and security of maritime navigation.
4. Their talks also connected Yemen, Gaza and Sudan, showing that Cairo and Riyadh increasingly view multiple regional crises through a common security lens.
5. Egypt brings geography, military weight, Arab diplomatic legitimacy and control of the Suez gateway; Saudi Arabia brings financial power, energy influence and Mohammed bin Salman’s increasingly activist regional strategy.
6. The emerging Arab order is therefore not simply a return to an old Cairo-Riyadh axis: it is an attempt by major Arab states to build greater regional capacity while still retaining important ties with Washington.

From one umbrella to overlapping alliances

1. Donald Trump’s United States remains indispensable: American forces, CENTCOM bases, naval assets, intelligence capabilities and defence relationships continue to underpin much of regional security.
2. Yet Washington is increasingly one layer among several. On 14 September, Mohammed bin Salman met CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper as Saudi Arabia confronted renewed Houthi pressure; U.S. support focused on intelligence and targeting assistance rather than opening another direct front.
3. On 7 August 2026, Mohammed bin Salman, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement in Mecca.
4. The pact is based on collective deterrence and deeper defence cooperation, bringing Pakistan formally into an important new Middle Eastern security framework alongside Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
5. On 31 August, its first Strategic Political and Defence Committee met in Istanbul, bringing together foreign ministers, defence ministers and military chiefs—evidence that the agreement is becoming institutional rather than remaining ceremonial.
6. But this is not the birth of one replacement bloc: MBS, Erdoğan and Shehbaz cooperate through the Makkah framework; Sisi, Erdoğan and Sheikh Tamim cooperate in Gaza mediation; King Abdullah II works closely with both Washington and Arab capitals; and Gulf states simultaneously preserve channels with Iran. The emerging system is defined by overlap.

Conclusion

The new Middle East is not yet a settled order; it is a transition visible in institutions, conflicts and leadership choices.

Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb can now affect energy and security simultaneously. Iran projects power through missiles, drones and aligned armed actors. Israel’s conflicts connect Gaza, Lebanon and Syria.

Erdoğan is shaping post-war Syria; Sisi and Mohammed bin Salman are coordinating Arab security; King Abdullah II is defending Jordan’s strategic position; and Sheikh Tamim remains central to mediation. America remains powerful, but regional states are adding their own partnerships.

The decisive change is structural: one dominant umbrella is being supplemented and increasingly challenged by overlapping centres of power.

Value addition

Glossary and related terms

Fixed blocs

Relatively stable political and security camps in which states are aligned mainly with one side or one principal external protector.

American security umbrella

The regional security structure in which U.S. military forces, bases, intelligence, naval assets and defence relationships underpin the security of partner states.

Multi-alignment

A strategy in which a state works with different partners on different issues instead of belonging exclusively to one geopolitical bloc.

Networked regional order

A regional system shaped by overlapping partnerships, corridors, armed actors, mediation channels and issue-specific coalitions rather than one fixed alliance map.

Maritime chokepoint

A narrow sea passage where disruption can affect energy flows, shipping, insurance costs and global trade.

Strait of Hormuz

The Gulf maritime chokepoint highlighted in the session as central to energy security and regional strategic calculations.

Bab el-Mandeb

The narrow gateway between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden that links local conflict in Yemen with global maritime trade.

Suez–Red Sea corridor

The connected maritime route running through the Suez Canal and Red Sea, with Egypt controlling the northern gateway.

Asymmetric warfare

Warfare in which relatively inexpensive capabilities such as missiles, drones and unmanned systems can impose high costs on stronger conventional forces.

Ansar Allah / Houthis

The Yemeni armed movement discussed in the session as an important regional actor linked with Iran while also possessing its own Yemeni leadership and interests.

Proxy

An actor supported or influenced by an outside power; the session distinguishes such support from the stronger claim that the outside state directly controls every decision.

CENTCOM

United States Central Command, the U.S. military command responsible for operations and security relationships across much of the Middle East and surrounding region.

Two-state principle

The diplomatic principle referenced in the session for a negotiated Israeli and Palestinian political settlement based on two states.

Mediation

Diplomatic efforts by third parties to facilitate negotiations, illustrated in the session through roles played by Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye in Gaza diplomacy.

Makkah Joint Defence Agreement

The defence agreement described in the PPT as linking Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan through collective deterrence and deeper defence cooperation.

Collective deterrence

A security approach in which partners seek to discourage attack by signalling that they will cooperate in defence and impose shared costs on an aggressor.

Strategic Political and Defence Committee

The committee described in the session as the institutional mechanism bringing together political, defence and military leadership under the Makkah framework.

Overlapping alliances

Multiple partnerships that coexist and intersect, allowing the same state to cooperate with different countries on defence, mediation, trade or diplomacy.