Global Affairs Session 93 14 September 2026

BIN SALMAN IN TROUBLE

Yemen tests his leadership

Saudi Arabia (KSA) has been integral to the US foreign policy in Middle East since 1940s. It is also crucial for maintaining the Petrodollar. Today, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) remains firmly in power, but Yemen is again testing Saudi strategy, influence, and leadership credibility. Recent Houthi gains around Mokha and Bab el-Mandeb have exposed the costs of fragmented alliances, Saudi-UAE rivalry, and an unresolved conflict. The central issue is not whether MBS is about to fall, but whether repeated setbacks in Yemen are weakening Saudi deterrence, complicating Vision 2030 ambitions, and expanding Iranian regional leverage today.

Summary

Saudi Arabia (KSA) has been integral to the US foreign policy in Middle East since 1940s. It is also crucial for maintaining the Petrodollar.

Today, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) remains firmly in power, but Yemen is again testing Saudi strategy, influence, and leadership credibility.

Recent Houthi gains around Mokha and Bab el-Mandeb have exposed the costs of fragmented alliances, Saudi-UAE rivalry, and an unresolved conflict.

The central issue is not whether MBS is about to fall, but whether repeated setbacks in Yemen are weakening Saudi deterrence, complicating Vision 2030 ambitions, and expanding Iranian regional leverage today.

Why is Saudi important for America – Five reasons

1. Petrodollar system: Saudi oil has historically been traded mainly in US dollars, supporting global demand for the dollar and strengthening its reserve-currency role.
2. US Treasuries and investments: Saudi Arabia holds significant US financial assets, including Treasury securities, and invests heavily in the American economy.
3. Leadership in the GCC: As the largest and most influential Gulf state, Saudi Arabia is central to US security, defence and diplomatic strategy across the GCC.
4. Oil and OPEC+ influence: Saudi production decisions can significantly affect global oil prices, US fuel costs and inflation.
5. Abraham Accords and regional strategy: The US wants Saudi-Israel normalization to deepen the Abraham Accords and create a broader Middle Eastern security and economic partnership.
6. Saudi Arabia matters because it connects oil, the dollar, US finance, Gulf security and Middle East diplomacy.

How MBS rose to power

1. Entered the royal inner circle: From 2013, Mohammed bin Salman gained direct access to his father, Salman, and became increasingly influential inside the royal court.
2. Rose rapidly after Salman became king: In 2015, MBS was appointed Defence Minister, then Deputy Crown Prince, while also taking charge of the powerful Council of Economic and Development Affairs.
3. Built an independent national power base: Through Vision 2030, economic reform and control over major policy portfolios, MBS expanded his influence far beyond the royal court.
4. Removed the main succession rival: In June 2017, King Salman removed Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and appointed MBS Crown Prince, concentrating succession and executive power around him.
5. Consolidated control over the state: The 2017 anti-corruption purge, followed by growing control over defence, economic policy and key security institutions, weakened rival power centres. His appointment as Prime Minister in 2022 formalized the dominant executive role he was already exercising.

How MBN lost and MBS won

1. Health and dependency concerns were used as the official justification. Mohammed bin Nayef’s chronic pain and dependence on prescription medication, following injuries from a 2009 Al-Qaeda assassination attempt, had impaired his ability to govern effectively.
2. MBN and MBS differed on major regional policies. Their approaches diverged on key issues, including the Yemen war, where MBS was closely identified with the 2015 hostile intervention while MBN was seen as less enthusiastic.
3. The Qatar crisis deepened their policy split. MBS backed a hard line toward Qatar in 2017, and pushed an embargo, while MBN was reported to prefer a more diplomatic approach and to maintain channels of communication with Doha.
4. MBS ultimately won the struggle for influence at home and in Washington. MBN had long-standing U.S. credibility as a counter-terrorism partner, but MBS built direct ties with the Trump White House and increasingly displaced him as Saudi Arabia’s principal power centre and international interlocutor.

Is MBS really in trouble – Six strategic pressures

1. Houthi escalation has become the most immediate security challenge. Renewed Houthi attacks and advances around Yemen and the Red Sea are threatening Saudi territory, energy infrastructure and shipping routes. The disruption of Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline is a serious shock.
2. Saudi Arabia still needs U.S. military backing - but Washington has limits. MBS sought direct American military action against the Houthis, while the United States instead offered intelligence and targeting support.
3. Israel normalization a difficult strategic choice. A Saudi-Israel agreement could unlock major benefits in relations with the US, but KSA continues to link normalization to the Palestinian question. In July 2026, President Trump also tied a proposed U.S.-Saudi civilian nuclear agreement to Saudi recognition of Israel, increasing the strategic stakes.
4. Saudi Arabia must manage both Iran and competition within the Gulf. Saudi faces the challenge of deterring Iran and Iran-aligned groups while avoiding a wider regional war. At the same time, relations with the UAE have experienced significant disagreements over Yemen, oil policy and regional strategy.
5. Royal-family rivals have largely been neutralized - but succession politics still matter. MBS’s rise involved breaking with the kingdom’s traditional succession pattern. Mohammed bin Nayef was removed as crown prince in 2017, while other independent royal and institutional power centres were subsequently weakened. Maintaining elite loyalty and managing the eventual transition from King Salman remain fundamental to the durability of his rule.
6. Vision 2030 must continue delivering economically. MBS has tied his leadership closely to transforming Saudi Arabia beyond oil through investment, tourism, technology, infrastructure and major projects. Fiscal pressures have already forced Riyadh to reassess or delay some flagship developments, making economic delivery an important domestic test alongside security and geopolitics.

Fresh threats from Ansar Allah

1. On 14 September 2026, a statement attributed to Major General Mohammed Nasser al-Atifi said that the “next battle” would not remain confined to Yemen and would extend into the territory of countries involved in the conflict.
2. Al-Atifi is part of the Ansar Allah (Houthi) military establishment based in Sana’a. He serves as defence minister in the Houthi-controlled administration in Sana’a. He does not represent Yemen’s internationally recognized government led by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).
3. Yemen remains divided between rival political and military authorities. The Houthis control Sana’a and large parts of northern and western Yemen, while the PLC represents the internationally recognized government.
4. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) is a separate Yemeni actor. It is a southern political-military movement distinct from both Ansar Allah and the PLC-led government.

Yemen as Saudi Arabia’s recurring trap

1. Saudi military involvement in Yemen has repeatedly exposed weaknesses in planning, logistics, intelligence, coalition management, and understanding complex local political structures.
2. Operation Scorched Earth in 2009 damaged Prince Khalid bin Sultan’s standing after Saudi forces struggled against Houthi fighters near the border.
3. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia launched a major intervention intended to restore Yemen’s government and reverse Houthi territorial gains after Sanaa’s capture.
4. Extensive air power inflicted substantial damage but failed to translate military superiority into a decisive or sustainable political settlement on the ground.
5. The United Nations-backed truce beginning in 2022 significantly reduced cross-border attacks, although Yemen’s competing political and military authorities remained unresolved.
6. By 2026, familiar patterns had returned: fragmented local alliances, external interference, uncertain Saudi strategy, and an increasingly resilient Houthi movement.

From intervention to uneasy accommodation

1. Saudi Arabia entered Yemen in March 2015 at the head of a coalition seeking to reverse Houthi gains and restore President Hadi’s government.
2. Mohammed bin Nayef became crown prince in April 2015, while the younger Mohammed bin Salman exercised growing influence as Saudi defence minister.
3. In June 2017, MBS replaced Mohammed bin Nayef as crown prince, accelerating an unprecedented concentration of political and security authority.
4. Riyadh gradually pursued de-escalation as repeated Houthi drone and missile attacks demonstrated Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability to relatively inexpensive asymmetric weapons.
5. The 2018 Stockholm Agreement reduced fighting around Hodeidah, but it neither disarmed the Houthis nor produced a comprehensive national political settlement.
6. Saudi accommodation therefore reduced immediate cross-border risks without fundamentally resolving the military, ideological, economic, and territorial foundations of the conflict.

The Saudi-UAE split in southern Yemen

1. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates entered the Yemen war as partners, but their preferred allies and political objectives increasingly diverged soon.
2. Abu Dhabi developed close relationships with southern Yemeni security forces, coastal groups, and the Southern Transitional Council around Aden and surrounding regions.
3. Riyadh remained more closely associated with Yemen’s internationally recognised political structures and factions seeking to preserve a formally unified Yemeni state.
4. The rise of the Southern Transitional Council created another powerful centre of authority within the already fragmented coalition opposing Houthi expansion.
5. Tensions intensified during 2025 and 2026 as Saudi-backed and UAE-associated Yemeni factions competed for influence across southern and eastern Yemen.
6. These divisions weakened anti-Houthi coordination and created operational opportunities that the Houthis could exploit along strategically important coastal territories.

Why Mokha matters strategically

1. Mokha lies close to Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow maritime gateway connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea.
2. Houthi control near Mokha can improve coastal surveillance, drone operations, missile positioning, mining possibilities, and pressure against commercial maritime traffic.
3. Control of nearby coastline and islands could further expand the Houthis’ ability to threaten vessels travelling through one of global trade’s critical corridors.
4. Disruption around Bab el-Mandeb affects shipping schedules, insurance premiums, Suez Canal traffic, energy transportation costs, and international supply-chain reliability.
5. Renewed attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure have also demonstrated how Yemen’s conflict can directly affect Saudi Arabia’s internal economic security.
6. Mokha therefore matters far beyond Yemen because control near the chokepoint connects local warfare with global maritime and energy-security calculations.

Iran, Houthis and regional leverage

1. The Houthis maintain close military and political links with Iran, although they also possess their own Yemeni objectives, leadership structures, and decision-making interests.
2. Tehran gains strategically whenever pressure increases simultaneously around the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Saudi territory, and major regional shipping routes.
3. Missiles, drones, coastal weapons and sea mines enable comparatively inexpensive asymmetric forces to impose substantial economic and military costs on stronger adversaries.
4. Saudi Arabia therefore faces a difficult choice between stronger military retaliation and avoiding another costly, open-ended campaign inside neighbouring Yemen.
5. Washington and other external powers must similarly balance maritime protection, regional deterrence, escalation risks, and reluctance to re-enter Yemen’s civil conflict.
6. Continued Houthi expansion consequently strengthens Iran’s regional leverage even without assuming that Tehran directly commands every Houthi military decision.

Legitimacy, succession and strategic repair

1. Mohammed bin Salman’s domestic authority rests on political control, economic transformation, social reforms, national security performance, and delivery of Vision 2030 ambitions.
2. Repeated setbacks in Yemen can nevertheless challenge the image of a highly decisive leader capable of protecting Saudi strategic interests across the region.
3. There remains no credible publicly available evidence proving that an imminent royal palace coup against Mohammed bin Salman is currently underway.
4. Saudi elite politics are exceptionally opaque, meaning internal dissatisfaction may exist without outsiders being able to measure its scale or political consequences.
5. Strategic repair requires better Gulf coordination, stronger southern Yemeni institutions, maritime security cooperation, realistic diplomacy, and sustainable arrangements with local actors.
6. The most defensible conclusion is that MBS faces a strategic credibility challenge, not evidence that his political reign is presently collapsing.

Conclusion

Mohammed bin Salman’s position is not collapsing, but Yemen has become a serious strategic liability.

The conflict reveals how military power, divided partnerships, maritime insecurity, and local political fragmentation can undermine even a powerful regional state.

Mokha’s fall increases pressure on Saudi Arabia, global shipping, and Bab el-Mandeb security. The strongest conclusion is that MBS faces a credibility and policy challenge, not a proven succession crisis.

Saudi recovery will depend on coordination, diplomacy, maritime defence, and engagement with Yemeni actors.

Value addition

Glossary and related terms

Mohammed bin Salman (MBS)

Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister whose leadership, security strategy and Vision 2030 agenda are the focus of this session.

Mohammed bin Nayef (MBN)

Former Saudi crown prince who was removed in 2017 as Mohammed bin Salman became crown prince.

Petrodollar

The role of U.S.-dollar-denominated oil trade in supporting global demand for the dollar, discussed here through Saudi-U.S. relations.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

The Gulf grouping in which Saudi Arabia is presented as the largest and most influential state.

OPEC+

The oil-producer framework in which Saudi production decisions can influence global oil prices, fuel costs and inflation.

Vision 2030

Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation agenda linked to investment, tourism, technology, infrastructure and diversification beyond oil.

Abraham Accords

The regional normalization framework that makes possible Saudi-Israel normalization strategically important for Washington.

Ansar Allah / Houthis

The Houthi movement controlling Sana’a and large parts of northern and western Yemen, and a central security challenge in this session.

Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)

The internationally recognized Yemeni leadership referred to in the session as distinct from Ansar Allah and the Southern Transitional Council.

Southern Transitional Council (STC)

A southern Yemeni political-military movement distinct from both Ansar Allah and the PLC-led government.

Bab el-Mandeb

The narrow maritime gateway connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea.

Mokha

A Yemeni Red Sea port area close to Bab el-Mandeb whose control is tied to surveillance, missiles, drones and shipping pressure.

East-West Pipeline

Saudi Arabia’s cross-country oil route whose disruption is treated in the session as a serious security and economic shock.

Maritime chokepoint

A narrow sea passage where disruption can affect shipping, insurance, energy transport and global supply chains.

Asymmetric weapons

Relatively inexpensive capabilities such as drones, missiles, coastal weapons and sea mines that can impose high costs on stronger adversaries.

Operation Scorched Earth

The 2009 Saudi campaign cited as an earlier example of the difficulty of fighting Houthi forces near the border.

Stockholm Agreement

The 2018 agreement that reduced fighting around Hodeidah without producing a comprehensive political settlement.

Saudi-UAE rivalry in Yemen

The divergence between Saudi-backed and UAE-associated Yemeni actors and political objectives, especially in southern and eastern Yemen.

Succession politics

The internal royal-family and institutional power questions surrounding MBS’s rise and the eventual transition from King Salman.

Strategic credibility challenge

The session’s conclusion that repeated setbacks may weaken the image of decisive Saudi leadership without proving imminent political collapse.