CHINA AND JAPAN | A DENSE RELATIONSHIP

Global Affairs Session 61 01 July 2026

CHINA AND JAPAN

A dense, uneasy relationship

China and Japan share a dense, uneasy relationship: ancient cultural exchange, modern trauma from Japanese imperialism, deep trade interdependence, and sharp strategic rivalry. Since China’s rise and Japan’s alliance with America, disputes over history, Taiwan, technology, and the East China Sea keep cooperation practical but trust fragile and crisis-prone today.

Dense, uneasy relationship Historical roots, 1500–1950 1950s to 2026 Growth models Rivalry over the seas America’s role

A dense, uneasy relationship

China and Japan share a dense, uneasy relationship: ancient cultural exchange, modern trauma from Japanese imperialism, deep trade interdependence, and sharp strategic rivalry.

Since China’s rise and Japan’s alliance with America, disputes over history, Taiwan, technology, and the East China Sea keep cooperation practical but trust fragile and crisis-prone today.

Historical relationship since 1500 AD till 1950

Five centuries of contact moved China and Japan from indirect conflict and controlled trade to imperial war and a fragile postwar reset, leaving deep wartime trauma at the centre of the relationship.

• 1500s: indirect war through Korea. Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea from 1592 were linked to ambition toward China; Korean resistance and Ming Chinese help forced Japan’s withdrawal after Hideyoshi’s death in 1598.
• 1600s–1800s: controlled trade, limited diplomacy. Under Tokugawa Japan, China-Japan contact continued mainly through Nagasaki trade; after Qing China lifted its maritime ban in 1684, Chinese ships to Nagasaki increased, but relations were commercial rather than full diplomatic partnership.
• 1894–95: Japan displaced China as East Asia’s rising power. The First Sino-Japanese War ended with the Treaty of Shimonoseki; Qing China recognized Korean independence, ceded Taiwan/Formosa and the Pescadores to Japan, and paid a heavy indemnity.
• 1931–45: Japanese imperial expansion created lasting trauma. Japan’s seizure of Manchuria and full-scale war against China from 1937 made wartime memory central to Chinese nationalism and to later distrust of Japan.
• 1945–50: postwar reset, but no immediate reconciliation. Japan’s defeat ended its empire; China entered civil war, the PRC was founded in 1949, and Japan remained under U.S. occupation and aligned with Washington, delaying formal Japan-PRC normalization.

China vs. Japan – 1950s to 2026

Cold War separation gave way to 1972 normalisation and decades of economic partnership, but the balance of power shifted toward China after 2010 and tensions over Taiwan sharpened again by the middle of 2026.

• 1950s–60s: Cold War separation. Japan was anchored in the U.S. camp, while the PRC was isolated from Japan diplomatically; Japan recognized Taipei, not Beijing, until 1972.
• 1972: diplomatic normalization. Japan recognized the PRC as China’s sole legal government, acknowledged wartime damage, and Beijing renounced war reparations; both sides agreed to peaceful relations and dispute settlement.
• 1978–2000s: economic partnership expanded. The 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty deepened economic and cultural exchanges; Japan later supported China’s development, including more than 3 trillion yen in ODA, while firms built supply chains in China.
• 2010s: balance shifted toward China. China overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest economy in 2010; Japan increasingly saw China’s military expansion, East China Sea activity, and Taiwan pressure as security challenges.
• 2025–June 2026: tensions sharpened. Taiwan-related remarks by Japan’s Prime Minister triggered Chinese anger, and by June 2026 China had placed more Japanese entities under export controls for dual-use items, while Japan protested the steps.

Comparison of growth models

Japan’s export-led, private-firm model and China’s larger, state-capitalist model produced different growth paths and now face different problems: Japan is trying to revive growth, while China is trying to rebalance it.

• Japan’s model was earlier, export-led, and private-firm driven. Postwar Japan relied on manufacturing exports, technology absorption, disciplined firms, keiretsu networks, high savings, and state guidance, but within a U.S.-protected security order.
• China’s model was later, larger, and more state-capitalist. Since reform and opening, China combined export manufacturing, infrastructure, urbanization, foreign investment, state industrial policy, and huge domestic savings.
• Japan became rich before becoming old; China is aging before becoming fully rich. Japan’s challenge since the 1990s has been slow growth, deflationary pressure, debt, and demographics; China now faces property weakness, low confidence, deflationary pressure, and the need for productivity-led growth.
• China’s model is more investment-heavy. The ECB describes China’s rise as closely linked to an investment-led model financed by high savings and subsidized lending into infrastructure, manufacturing, and real estate, now facing diminishing returns.
• Japan is trying to revive growth; China is trying to rebalance it. By June 2026, Japan’s draft economic blueprint targeted real growth above 1% and major public-private investment through 2040; China’s problem is shifting from quantity-led expansion to balanced, high-quality growth.

Rivalry over the seas

Beneath the economic ties lies a persistent maritime rivalry: disputed islands, daily coast guard pressure, contested resources, and a Taiwan Strait that could turn a sea dispute into a far wider conflict.

• Core dispute: Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Japan administers the Senkaku Islands; China claims them as Diaoyu. Japan says China did not contest Japanese sovereignty for roughly 75 years after 1895 and that the issue intensified in the 1970s after possible oil reserves drew attention.
• Coast guard pressure is persistent. Japan says Chinese coast guard and other ships enter the contiguous zone around the Senkakus almost daily except in stormy weather and intrude into territorial waters several times a month.
• East China Sea resources matter. Beyond islands, both sides compete over gas fields, seabed resources, and maritime jurisdiction; Japan’s foreign ministry tracks China’s unilateral natural-resource development in the East China Sea.
• Taiwan Strait links the sea rivalry to war risk. Japan’s southwest islands sit close to Taiwan; any Taiwan conflict would directly affect Japanese security, sea lanes, U.S. bases in Japan, and Japan-China crisis calculations.
• China uses grey-zone tools; Japan relies on law, coast guard, alliance deterrence. The rivalry is rarely open war; it is patrols, air/naval movements, legal claims, economic pressure, and alliance signaling.

America in this equation

Washington’s alliance with Tokyo anchors Japan’s deterrence but deepens Chinese suspicion, and by mid-2026 U.S.-China-Taiwan tensions had made the China-Japan rivalry increasingly triangular.

• America is Japan’s security anchor. The U.S.-Japan alliance is described by both governments as a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific peace and security, and the U.S. has reaffirmed defense commitments to Japan.
• The Senkaku issue is tied to the U.S. treaty. The U.S. and Japan reaffirmed in 2025 that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, while opposing attempts to undermine Japan’s administration there.
• U.S. bases make Japan strategically central. For China, U.S. forces in Japan mean any Taiwan or East China Sea crisis could involve American power launched from Japanese territory.
• America strengthens Japan’s deterrence but worsens Chinese suspicion. Tokyo sees the alliance as necessary because of China’s military rise; Beijing sees U.S.-Japan coordination, Taiwan statements, and economic-security controls as containment.
• By June 2026, U.S.-China-Taiwan tensions fed Japan-China tensions. U.S. warnings about Chinese pressure on Taiwan-related engagement, Western criticism of Chinese maritime activity, and Japan’s concern over Taiwan made the relationship more triangular: China-Japan rivalry is now inseparable from U.S.-China competition.

Value addition

Glossary and related terms

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

A group of uninhabited East China Sea islands administered by Japan and claimed by China, as Diaoyu, and by Taiwan.

Treaty of Shimonoseki

The 1895 treaty ending the First Sino-Japanese War, under which Qing China ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan and paid a heavy indemnity.

Tributary system

A hierarchical diplomatic and trade arrangement in which neighbouring states such as Joseon Korea recognized China's primacy in exchange for trade and protection.

Keiretsu

Networks of Japanese firms linked by cross-shareholding and long-term business ties, historically a pillar of Japan's postwar growth model.

Official development assistance (ODA)

Government aid, loans and grants extended to support another country's economic development, as Japan provided to China from the late 1970s.

Contiguous zone

A maritime band beyond a country's territorial waters in which a coastal state may enforce certain customs, immigration and security laws.

Article V, U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

The treaty provision under which the United States commits to respond to an armed attack on territories under Japanese administration.

Grey-zone tactics

Coercive actions such as coast guard patrols, legal claims and economic pressure kept deliberately below the threshold of open military conflict.

Dual-use export controls

Restrictions on exporting goods or technology that could serve both civilian and military purposes.

East China Sea

The semi-enclosed sea between China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, home to disputed islands, gas fields and overlapping maritime claims.

Taiwan Strait

The waterway separating mainland China from Taiwan, a potential flashpoint whose stability directly affects Japanese security.

Joseon dynasty

The Korean royal dynasty that ruled from 1392 to 1897, positioned between Ming and Qing China and, later, an expanding Japan.

State-capitalist model

An economic system in which the state retains a dominant role in directing investment and strategic industries alongside market activity.

Triangular rivalry

A strategic dynamic in which the interactions of three powers, here the United States, China and Japan, with Taiwan at the centre, shape each bilateral relationship.

Value addition

Conceptual references

• Historical scholarship on the First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars and their role in shaping modern Chinese and Japanese nationalism.
• Diplomatic-history accounts of the 1972 Japan-China normalisation and the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty.
• Comparative political-economy literature on export-led versus investment-led growth models in East Asia.
• Maritime-security analysis of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute and East China Sea resource competition.
• Alliance-politics literature on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its application to territorial disputes.