UKRAINE AND RUSSIA – FOREVER ENGAGEMENT?
Global Affairs
Session 80
18 August 2026
UKRAINE AND RUSSIA — A FOREVER ENGAGEMENT?
A war deep into its fifth year
By August 2026, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had entered its fifth bloody year with no durable ceasefire and no decisive battlefield breakthrough. The conflict had become a contest of drones, ballistic missiles, air defence, logistics and industrial capacity, while stalled diplomacy and the Iran war reshaped military resources, energy markets and Russia’s leverage.
Ukraine and Russia – a forever engagement?
By August 2026, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had entered its fifth bloody year with no durable ceasefire and no decisive battlefield breakthrough.
Russia reported summer gains in southeastern Ukraine, while Kyiv said it had retaken hundreds of square kilometres during 2026.
The war has increasingly become a contest of drones, ballistic missiles, air defence, logistics and industrial capacity. Civilian casualties rose sharply in 2026, while Ukraine faced serious shortages of Patriot interceptors.
Diplomacy remained stalled despite renewed Ukrainian proposals to US mediators. Meanwhile, the Iran war diverted American attention and air-defence resources, reshaped energy markets, and indirectly strengthened Russia’s leverage.
USSR Ukraine Freedom & NATO
- 1991 - USSR breaks up: Ukraine becomes an independent country after the Soviet Union collapses.
- Ukraine inherits nuclear weapons: It temporarily has one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, though operational control was complicated and tied to former Soviet systems.
- 1994 - Ukraine gives up the nukes: Under the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine agrees to transfer nuclear weapons to Russia and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state, in return for security assurances.
- 1999–2004 - NATO expands eastward: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic join first; later the Baltic states and several other former communist countries join.
- Russia sees NATO moving closer: Moscow increasingly views NATO expansion, especially the possibility of Ukraine joining, as a major security threat and a loss of its traditional sphere of influence.
Crimea invasion and annexation by Russia
- Feb–Mar 2014 - Russia seizes and annexes Crimea: Russian forces took control of Crimea; a March 16 referendum was held under Russian control, followed by Russia's annexation. The UN General Assembly rejected the referendum's validity and reaffirmed Ukraine's territorial integrity.
- Why Crimea: It gave Russia strategic control of Sevastopol and the Black Sea, prevented a major loss of Russian influence after Ukraine's political shift toward the West, and carried powerful historical and nationalist significance for Moscow. So → Black Sea access • Sevastopol naval base • Ukraine's westward shift • Russian influence • Historical claims.
- April 2014 - War begins in the Donbas: Armed Russia-backed separatist forces seized territory in Donetsk and Luhansk, triggering sustained fighting between Ukrainian forces and separatist formations and beginning the eastern phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war.
- 5 September 2014 - Minsk I signed: Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE-led Trilateral Contact Group, together with representatives of separatist-held areas, agreed to the Minsk Protocol. It called for an immediate ceasefire, monitoring, prisoner releases and steps toward a political settlement, but fighting continued.
- 19 Sept 2014 & 12 Feb 2015 - Minsk framework strengthened; Minsk II agreed: A September memorandum specified implementation measures. After renewed heavy fighting, the Minsk II Package of Measures was agreed on 12 February 2015, including a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons, political reforms, elections and eventual restoration of Ukrainian control of its international border.
- 2015–2021 - Minsk remains unfulfilled; conflict becomes prolonged: Minsk reduced the conflict's intensity at various times but was never fully implemented. Fighting and ceasefire violations persisted in the Donbas, while Crimea remained under Russian control. The EU continued its sanctions against Russia.
What was achieved in the War
- A war deep into its fifth year: Fighting has continued simultaneously on land, over cities, in the Black Sea and through long-range attacks deep inside both countries, causing many deaths.
- Russia still holds the initiative in parts of the southeast: On 15 August, Russia’s Defence Ministry said its summer campaign captured 19 settlements in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions.
- Ukraine has also regained territory: President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukrainian forces recovered ~745 sqkm of Russian-held territory during 2026, mainly across the southeastern front. The competing claims underline how fluid parts of the battlefield remain.
- Russian advances slowed a lot: Moscow’s overall frontline progress had slowed during 2026, even as Russia increasingly relied on ballistic missiles, drones and attacks on Ukrainian urban and economic infrastructure.
- Civilian cost worsening: UN monitors verified 437 civilians killed and 2,610 injured in Ukraine in July 2026. July recorded the highest overall monthly civilian casualty total documented by the UN mission since March 2022.
- Central reality is attrition: Russia is attempting to use manpower, missiles, economic endurance and continuous pressure; Ukraine is trying to offset Russia’s scale through drones, precision strikes, battlefield innovation and Western assistance. The war therefore increasingly resembles a competition over which side can sustain resources, technology and political will longer.
Missiles, Drones, Deep inside other’s territory
- Missiles and drones now shape the war far beyond the frontline: Russia launched at least 429 missiles during July, more than twice June’s number. Long-range missiles and drones remained the largest single source of civilian casualties that month.
- Ukraine is systematically targeting Russia’s energy economy: Ukrainian drones have struck refineries and logistical facilities in places including Perm, Ryazan, Taganrog and other locations hundreds or even more than a thousand kilometres from Ukrainian-held territory.
- The Orsk refinery illustrated the economic strategy: A Ukrainian strike in August badly damaged Russia’s Orsk refinery, which processes about six million tonnes of crude annually. Russian authorities indicated that repairs could take months, partly because sanctions complicate access to specialised equipment.
- Black Sea has become another active battlefield: Ukraine has targeted Russian naval and port infrastructure around Novorossiysk, while Russia has intensified attacks on Ukrainian ports including Odesa and surrounding facilities. Commercial shipping is increasingly exposed to the conflict.
- Even a limited maritime ceasefire is difficult: Ukraine offered through an intermediary to halt attacks on civilian shipping in the Black Sea. On 14 August, Moscow rejected the idea of a partial ceasefire, arguing against measures that would merely give Ukraine temporary relief.
- Food security becoming part of the war: By mid-August, Ukrainian grain exports were sharply disrupted by intensified Black Sea attacks and reduced port activity. Russia and Ukraine are both major agricultural exporters.
Why peace does not work here
- US-mediated talks produced contacts but no settlement: Ukraine and Russia held US-brokered talks in Abu Dhabi early in 2026. The January round ended without a peace agreement.
- Negotiating process then lost momentum: By July, the Kremlin said there was no immediate prospect of restarting substantive talks. Earlier meetings had taken place in Istanbul, Abu Dhabi and Geneva, but the diplomatic process largely stalled during 2026.
- Ukraine made another attempt in August: On 11 August, Zelenskyy announced that Kyiv had given American negotiators new proposals for ending the war. He did not publicly disclose the detailed terms.
- US remains central to any possible breakthrough: US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were again being discussed as possible intermediaries with both Moscow and Kyiv. Ukraine wants Washington to combine negotiations with stronger air defence and economic pressure on Russia.
- Moscow continues to negotiate while fighting: In late July, the Kremlin said it would wait for new American proposals but would meanwhile continue pursuing its objectives through military means. This explains why diplomatic contacts have not translated into an operational ceasefire.
- Failed Black Sea initiative shows the core problem: If Russia and Ukraine cannot yet agree on a narrowly defined halt to attacks on civilian shipping, achieving consensus over territory, security arrangements, sanctions and the future military status of Ukraine remains considerably harder.
Wider context of this war
- Europe continues increasing economic pressure on Moscow: On 23 July, the EU adopted its 21st sanctions package, targeting Russian banks, financial institutions, cryptocurrency networks, energy-linked entities and parts of the shadow fleet. The package included 218 new individual and entity listings.
- European financial support for Ukraine remains large: Earlier in 2026, the EU formally approved a €90 billion loan for Ukraine, demonstrating that Kyiv’s ability to sustain the war is tied not only to weapons but also to continuing external financing.
- Ukraine itself is devoting extraordinary resources to defence: In June, its parliament approved an additional $34.7 billion for defence and security in the 2026 budget.
- Russia is also paying an increasing fiscal price: Russia’s federal budget deficit reached about 5.73 trillion roubles in the first half of 2026, or roughly 2.5% of GDP, while higher state expenditure continued to reflect the burden of sustaining the war economy.
- Conflict no longer simply Russia versus Ukraine: North Korean weapons and personnel have strengthened Moscow’s war effort, while Ukraine depends extensively on European and American financial, intelligence, weapons and air-defence support. The military balance therefore depends heavily on external coalitions.
- Europe responding by strengthening its own defence capacity: European leaders in 2026 increasingly emphasised greater responsibility for continental security, expanded defence industries, action against Russia’s shadow fleet and longer-term military assistance for Ukraine amid uncertainty about future American support.
Links with Iran War
- The two wars became directly connected after 28 February 2026: The US and Israel launched strikes on Iran, opening another major conflict at precisely the time Washington was trying to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv. Russia condemned the attacks, while Zelenskyy publicly supported the US position against Iran.
- Already a Russia–Iran military connection: The EU continued sanctions in 2026 specifically related to Iran’s military support for Russia’s war against Ukraine, as well as Iranian support for armed groups in West Asia.
- Iran war disrupted Ukraine peace diplomacy: US attention shifted towards the Gulf, planned talks faced delays, and Abu Dhabi itself became problematic as a negotiating venue following Iranian attacks in the region. By August, the Ukraine negotiating track had still not recovered its earlier momentum.
- Two wars compete for the same air-defence resources: Patriot PAC-3 interceptors are required both to protect Ukraine against Russian ballistic missiles and to defend US forces and Gulf partners against Iranian missiles. Zelenskyy warned in March that a prolonged Iran conflict could reduce supplies available to Ukraine; by August, allied interceptor deliveries to Kyiv had fallen sharply.
- Iran indirectly increased the importance of Russian energy: Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz pushed Asian buyers towards alternative supplies. India, for example, dramatically increased Russian crude purchases as Middle Eastern supply became less reliable, providing Moscow with an important market despite Western pressure.
- Both wars demonstrate new economics of drone warfare: Relatively inexpensive drones can attack refineries, ports and energy infrastructure while defenders may need far more expensive missiles to stop them. Disruption of Middle Eastern supply and Ukrainian attacks on Russian refining capacity intensified global energy stress.
Impact on India
- Russian oil even more important to India: In July 2026, Russia supplied a record 50.83% of India’s crude imports (2.47 million barrels per day). Middle Eastern disruption caused by the Iran war was a major reason.
- This creates a new India–US friction point: On 7 August, the US Senate passed legislation that, if also approved by the House and signed into law, would allow tariffs of up to 100% against major buyers of Russian energy, explicitly including India.
- India faces a larger energy and external-balance challenge: India’s merchandise trade deficit widened to $31.98 billion in July, with the Middle East conflict contributing to higher oil and global freight costs. Ukraine and Iran therefore interact in ways that affect India’s inflation, currency and import bill.
- Fertiliser security is another concern: With Gulf supply and natural-gas markets disrupted, India opened discussions with countries including Russia, Belarus and Morocco to increase fertiliser supplies and protect availability for Indian agriculture.
- Defence ties with Russia cannot be separated from the war: India continues to operate substantial Russian-origin military equipment. S-400 deliveries have faced repeated delays, while India and Russia have discussed greater production of Russian-origin spare parts and defence equipment inside India.
- India’s diplomatic balancing act is now harder: Modi and Zelenskyy met again at the June 2026 G7 summit, where both discussed stronger bilateral ties, even as India continued its major economic and strategic relationship with Russia. India therefore has to simultaneously preserve Russian ties, deepen relations with Ukraine and Europe, manage pressure from Washington, and protect its own energy security.
Value addition
Glossary and related terms
- Budapest Memorandum
- The 1994 arrangement under which Ukraine agreed to transfer inherited nuclear weapons to Russia and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state in return for security assurances.
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
- The international treaty framework through which non-nuclear states commit not to acquire nuclear weapons while nuclear activity remains subject to agreed obligations.
- Security assurance
- A political commitment intended to support a state’s security, sovereignty or territorial integrity without necessarily creating an automatic military response.
- NATO enlargement
- The admission of additional countries into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including the eastward expansion described in the session.
- Sphere of influence
- An area in which a major power expects to exercise special strategic, political or security influence.
- Black Sea Fleet
- Russia’s naval formation historically associated with Sevastopol and increasingly dependent on Novorossiysk as Ukrainian attacks changed its operating pattern.
- Warm-water naval gateway
- A naval route or port system that remains usable through the year and provides sustained access to wider seas.
- Annexation
- The claimed incorporation of territory into another state. The session notes that Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea is not recognized by most of the international community.
- Territorial integrity
- The principle that a state’s recognized territory and borders should remain intact and should not be changed by force.
- Donbas
- The eastern Ukrainian area centred on Donetsk and Luhansk where sustained fighting began in 2014 between Ukrainian forces and Russia-backed separatist formations.
- Minsk Protocol and Minsk II
- Negotiated frameworks seeking ceasefires, withdrawal of heavy weapons, political measures and eventual restoration of Ukrainian control over its international border.
- War of attrition
- A prolonged conflict in which each side tries to exhaust the other’s manpower, weapons, finances, technology and political will.
- Ballistic missile
- A missile that travels over a long arcing trajectory and can strike targets far beyond the immediate frontline.
- Patriot PAC-3 interceptor
- An air-defence interceptor used against missile threats and described in the session as a scarce resource required in both Ukraine and the Gulf.
- Partial ceasefire
- A limited halt in hostilities covering a defined activity or location, such as attacks on civilian shipping, rather than the entire war.
- Shadow fleet
- A network of vessels and related entities used to keep energy trade moving despite sanctions and restrictions.
- War economy
- An economy in which state spending, industry and public resources are increasingly organised around sustaining a long conflict.
- External coalition
- A group of outside states supplying weapons, personnel, intelligence, finance or diplomatic backing to one side in a conflict.
- Energy security
- The ability to maintain reliable and affordable energy supplies despite war, sanctions, disrupted shipping routes or market shocks.
- External balance
- A country’s overall position in trade and international payments, which can deteriorate when oil and freight costs raise the import bill.
Value addition
Conceptual references
- The Soviet breakup, Ukrainian independence, inherited nuclear weapons and the Budapest Memorandum.
- NATO enlargement, Russia’s security perceptions and the idea of a sphere of influence.
- Russian naval geography, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk and warm-water access through the Black Sea.
- The annexation of Crimea, the Donbas conflict and the Minsk I and Minsk II frameworks.
- Attrition, long-range missile and drone warfare, air-defence scarcity and the economics of interception.
- Sanctions, external coalitions, defence financing, the shadow fleet and the fiscal burden of a war economy.
- The interaction of the Ukraine and Iran wars through diplomacy, energy markets, air defence and drone warfare.
- India’s energy security, trade deficit, fertiliser supplies, Russian-origin defence equipment and diplomatic balancing.
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