Global Affairs Session 87 3 September 2026

DEEP POLITICS OF NATO

More than Europe vs Russia — a bigger, more complex global story

NATO is the world’s most powerful collective-defence alliance, linking North America and Europe through a shared security commitment. Its central question now is whether Europe can build enough military capability and strategic autonomy to remain secure if American commitment becomes less certain.

Collective defence Alliance in place Asymmetry Europe’s defence problem Russia factor America question Europe without America? Internal fault lines NATO’s future Conclusion

Collective-defence alliance

NATO is the world’s most powerful collective-defence alliance, linking North America and Europe through a shared security commitment.

Its core principle, Article 5, treats an attack on one member as an attack on all. Yet NATO is more than a military pact: it is also a political bargain built around American strategic leadership and European security dependence.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has revived NATO’s relevance, expanded its membership and accelerated defence spending. But the alliance remains internally unequal. Its central question now is whether Europe can build enough military capability and strategic autonomy to remain secure if American commitment becomes less certain.

Getting the alliance in place

1. NATO began as a Cold War alliance to protect Western Europe under American security leadership.
2. Its core promise is Article 5: an attack on one ally is treated as an attack on all.
3. But NATO is not just a treaty. It is a political bargain: Europe accepts American strategic leadership, while America gains influence over European security.
4. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO became more relevant, larger and more militarily urgent.
5. Finland and Sweden joining NATO changed the northern balance and made the Baltic region strategically tighter for Russia.
6. The deep question is no longer whether NATO matters. The question is whether Europe can carry NATO if America becomes less willing, less predictable or more inward-looking.

Strong - but asymmetrical

1. NATO has 32 members, but the alliance is not equal in capability, command or political weight.
2. The United States remains the decisive military power inside NATO: nuclear deterrence, long-range strike, airlift, intelligence, command systems and high-end technology.
3. European allies have large economies and advanced militaries, but their defence systems remain fragmented across countries, industries, doctrines and procurement choices.
4. NATO’s military command structure still reflects American centrality: SACEUR is traditionally a US commander and is also linked to US European Command. (NATO)
5. So NATO is collectively powerful, but internally unbalanced.
6. Europe is not defenceless without America - but NATO as we know it is still built around American power.

Europe’s defence problem is not only money

1. European defence spending has risen sharply. NATO allies committed at The Hague Summit to invest 5% of GDP annually by 2035, including 3.5% for core defence and 1.5% for security-related investments. (NATO)
2. EU defence spending reached about €418 billion in 2025 and is projected around €454 billion in 2026.
3. But money alone does not automatically create military power.
4. Europe still faces shortages in ammunition, air defence, drones, logistics, strategic lift, intelligence, command systems and defence-industrial scale.
5. Many European countries buy separately, plan separately and maintain different weapons systems.
6. The deeper issue is not whether Europe can spend. It is whether Europe can organise power fast enough.

The Russia factor: why NATO returned

1. Russia’s war against Ukraine revived NATO’s original purpose: territorial defence against a major land power.
2. Eastern Europe sees NATO as survival, not theory.
3. Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Romania want stronger deterrence, faster deployment and permanent readiness.
4. Western Europe often thinks more in terms of escalation management, budgets, industry and long-term strategy.
5. This creates an internal political difference: the closer a country is to Russia, the more urgent NATO feels.
6. Russia has made NATO stronger politically, but also exposed how dependent Europe remains on American weapons, intelligence and strategic depth.

The America question

1. America created NATO, leads NATO and still anchors NATO’s credibility.
2. But American politics is changing. Europe now worries about US elections, burden-sharing demands, China priorities, domestic isolationism and future unpredictability.
3. For Washington, the question is: why should American taxpayers carry Europe’s defence forever?
4. For Europe, the question is: can we defend ourselves if America reduces commitment?
5. For Russia, the question is: can NATO unity be weakened by waiting for political change in Washington?
6. For China, the question is: will America be distracted in Europe when the Indo-Pacific becomes more dangerous?
7. NATO’s deep politics is therefore not only about Europe versus Russia. It is also about Europe’s dependence on America in a world where America has other priorities.

Can Europe defend itself without America?

1. The honest answer is: partly yes, but not yet fully.
2. Europe can defend territory, mobilise money, produce advanced weapons and build stronger armies.
3. But without America, Europe would face major gaps in nuclear deterrence, intelligence, command, air defence, long-range strike, logistics and high-end military coordination.
4. France and Britain have nuclear weapons, but they do not automatically replace the American nuclear umbrella for the whole alliance.
5. Germany has economic weight but is still rebuilding strategic confidence.
6. Poland is rising as a frontline military power, while France wants European strategic autonomy.
7. Europe can become more capable, but becoming capable is not the same as becoming strategically independent.

Internal fault lines inside NATO

1. NATO’s unity hides many internal tensions.
2. Eastern Europe wants maximum deterrence against Russia.
3. Southern Europe worries about migration, North Africa, the Mediterranean and instability.
4. Turkey is a NATO member but follows an independent regional strategy across Russia, Syria, the Black Sea and the Middle East.
5. France wants more European strategic autonomy, while many Eastern European countries trust America more than Brussels or Paris.
6. Germany is central economically, but still cautious militarily.
7. The alliance survives because these countries fear greater dangers outside NATO than disagreements inside NATO.

NATO’s future: alliance, insurance policy or dependency system?

1. NATO can be seen in three ways.
   1. For Eastern Europe, it is a survival shield.
   2. For Western Europe, it is a security framework.
   3. For America, it is both an alliance and a tool of strategic influence.
2. The 5% spending pledge shows that Europe is being pushed toward greater responsibility, but responsibility needs military integration, not only budgets.
3. If America remains committed, NATO will remain the strongest military alliance in the world.
4. If America becomes less reliable, Europe will have to build a European pillar inside NATO - or risk strategic exposure.
5. NATO’s future depends on whether Europe can move from protection to partnership.

Conclusion

NATO is powerful because it combines American power with European geography, industry and legitimacy. But its greatest strength is also its deepest vulnerability: dependence on the United States.

Europe is richer and more capable than many assume, but capability is scattered across national systems. Russia’s war revived NATO, Finland and Sweden expanded it, and the new spending commitments may strengthen it further.

Yet money, flags and declarations are not enough. The central test is clear: can Europe become strong enough to keep America engaged as a partner - and survive if America becomes less dependable?

Value addition

Glossary and related terms

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a transatlantic political and military alliance linking North America and Europe.

Collective defence

A security arrangement in which members agree that an attack on one is treated as a threat to all.

Article 5

The collective-defence clause of the North Atlantic Treaty, central to NATO’s mutual security commitment.

Deterrence

Discouraging an adversary from acting by making the expected costs of aggression outweigh the expected gains.

Nuclear deterrence

The use of nuclear capability and the threat of retaliation to discourage major attack.

American nuclear umbrella

The extended nuclear-deterrence assurance that the United States provides to allies.

SACEUR

Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the senior military commander responsible for NATO operations in Europe.

Strategic autonomy

The ability to make and execute major security decisions with less dependence on an outside power.

Burden-sharing

The distribution of defence spending, military capability and security responsibilities among allies.

Strategic lift

The ability to move troops, weapons and supplies over long distances quickly and at scale.

Defence-industrial scale

The capacity of defence industries to produce, replenish and sustain weapons and military equipment in sufficient quantities.

Eastern flank

NATO’s easternmost member states and strategic frontier facing Russia and the wider eastern security environment.

Transatlantic security

The security relationship connecting North America and Europe through alliances, military cooperation and shared strategic commitments.

Containment

A strategy associated in the presentation with George F. Kennan: limiting an adversary’s expansion through sustained political, economic and strategic pressure.

Value addition

Conceptual references

• The North Atlantic Treaty and Article 5 collective-defence principle.
• NATO command structure and the role of SACEUR, as referenced in the presentation.
• The Hague Summit spending commitment referenced in the presentation: 5% of GDP annually by 2035, comprising 3.5% for core defence and 1.5% for security-related investments.
• George F. Kennan’s containment framework and his warning on NATO expansion, as presented in the session.
• William J. Burns’s “Nyet Means Nyet” warning on Russia’s NATO-enlargement redlines, as presented in the session.
• Jens Stoltenberg’s 7 September 2023 statement on Russia’s war and NATO enlargement, as presented in the session.
• John J. Mearsheimer’s argument on NATO, Ukraine and the 2008 decision, as presented in the session.