Global Affairs Session 104 6 October 2026

ANSAR ALLAH UNDER ATTACK

Saudi strikes back

Ansar Allah’s September offensive transformed Yemen’s war by seizing Red Sea territory, reaching Bab al-Mandeb and tightening pressure around Taiz. Now, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces have strongly counterattacked with Saudi air support. Riyadh has also activated the Mecca JDA (collective defence arrangement) with Türkiye and Pakistan. The crisis now connects Yemen’s fractured battlefield with Saudi homeland security, oil infrastructure, maritime trade, regional deterrence and the wider confrontation involving Iran and its partners, with Israel playing its own game.

Summary

Ansar Allah’s September offensive transformed Yemen’s war by seizing Red Sea territory, reaching Bab al-Mandeb and tightening pressure around Taiz.

Now, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces have strongly counterattacked with Saudi air support. Riyadh has also activated the Mecca JDA (collective defence arrangement) with Türkiye and Pakistan.

The crisis now connects Yemen’s fractured battlefield with Saudi homeland security, oil infrastructure, maritime trade, regional deterrence and the wider confrontation involving Iran and its partners, with Israel playing its own game.

How Ansar Allah changed the battlefield

1. Force concentration: Ansar Allah quietly assembled about 1,00,000 fighters before September’s offensive, while Saudi-backed forces underestimated the scale and timing.
2. Coastal breakthrough: The offensive captured roughly 150 kilometres of Red Sea coastline, including Mocha, dramatically changing Yemen’s western military balance.
3. Bab al-Mandeb reached: Ansar Allah reached Hanish and Perim islands, placing forces directly beside one of the world’s most important shipping chokepoints.
4. Taiz squeezed: Its advance around Turbah and nearby routes increased pressure on Taiz, threatening links between government-held southern and central areas.
5. Opposition fragmented: Deep factional divisions, poor coordination and an untested Saudi-led command structure helped turn the Houthi offensive into a rout.
6. Weapons captured: Retreating government forces abandoned advanced Saudi and American-supplied equipment, giving Ansar Allah additional materiel and intelligence opportunities.

What exactly is the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement (JDA)

1. Pact created: Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement on 7th August 2026, creating a trilateral defence framework.
2. Collective-defence clause: The agreement treats an armed attack against one member as an attack against all, creating a formal shared-defence obligation.
3. Decision mechanism: Foreign ministers, defence ministers and military chiefs sit on the Strategic Political and Defence Committee that directs alliance implementation.
4. Activated on 5 October: After escalating attacks on Saudi territory, the committee ordered immediate practical implementation of the pact’s collective-defence commitments.
5. Deployment authorised: The three governments agreed to provide military forces and capabilities for rapid deployment inside Saudi Arabia under approved arrangements.
6. Important limit: No public decision authorises Turkish or Pakistani combat operations inside Yemen; current activation is explicitly focused on defending Saudi Arabia.

Why Saudi Arabia sees a systemic threat

1. Cross-border exposure: Ansar Allah has repeatedly launched or claimed missile and drone attacks against Saudi airports, military sites and energy infrastructure.
2. Energy artery disrupted: Houthi attacks temporarily disrupted Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline, an increasingly important alternative route when Gulf shipping is constrained.
3. Two-chokepoint pressure: Bab al-Mandeb becomes strategically dangerous when the Strait of Hormuz is already disrupted, reducing Saudi Arabia’s flexibility for energy exports.
4. Holy-site stakes: Saudi Arabia has accused Ansar Allah of threatening Mecca and Medina; the movement has disputed responsibility for important alleged attacks.
5. Deterrence shaken: September’s breakthrough exposed Saudi intelligence failures, fragmented Yemeni allies and limits on Riyadh’s ability to secure direct Western combat support.
6. Systemic threat: The danger combines homeland security, oil exports, holy-site protection and maritime access, making the challenge strategic even without threatening state survival.

Yemen on the ground, the three fractures

1. Fracture one, territory: Ansar Allah controls Sanaa and much of Yemen’s populous northwest, while the internationally recognised government holds areas farther south and east.
2. Why territory matters: This divide creates competing administrations, security systems and revenue bases, so battlefield movement immediately changes political and economic leverage.
3. Fracture two, the south: Southern separatist ambitions remain alive despite leadership changes, meaning anti-Houthi forces still disagree over whether Yemen should remain unified.
4. Fracture three, command: National Resistance, Giants Brigades, National Shield and regular government forces fight Ansar Allah through different commands, structures and loyalties.
5. Saudi coordination problem: The UAE withdrawal left Riyadh trying to integrate forces shaped by rival patrons, funding networks and years of mutual distrust.
6. Battlefield consequence: Ansar Allah’s unified command can exploit seams between territories, political objectives and military formations inside the broader anti-Houthi coalition.

The Saudi-backed counterattack

1. Counteroffensive launched: Yemen’s internationally recognised government launched a major offensive on 4 October, backed by intensive Saudi air power against Houthi positions.
2. Air campaign scale: Yemeni officials reported more than 1,000 strikes, while the Saudi-led coalition said about 100 aircraft flew at daybreak.
3. Dhubab recaptured: Government forces said they retook Dhubab and its airstrip, restoring positions directly controlling the northern approaches to Bab al-Mandeb.
4. Advance toward Mocha: By 5 October, government forces said they had reached Mocha’s outskirts, reversing most recent Houthi gains along the coast.
5. Control remains contested: There are no independent verifications of full government advance, while Ansar Allah rejected claims that its coastal positions had collapsed.
6. Maritime threat survives: Even if coastal control shifts, Ansar Allah could still attack vessels with drones launched from other positions.

What Pakistan and Türkiye are bringing

1. Pact deployment activated: Türkiye and Pakistan agreed on 5 October to provide forces and military capabilities for rapid deployment inside Saudi Arabia.
2. Mission remains undisclosed: The joint statement specifies no troop numbers, weapons, bases or operational roles for the newly agreed Turkish and Pakistani deployments.
3. Pakistan already present: Reuters reported 30,000 to 40,000 Pakistani troops already in Saudi Arabia, helping guard borders and intercept missiles and drones.
4. Support already reaches Yemen: Media says Pakistani equipment and advisers supporting Yemeni forces, while Turkish drones purchased earlier by Riyadh have operated over Yemen.
5. No combat decision: Pakistan has not announced troops for combat inside Yemen, and Türkiye has not publicly committed forces to direct Yemeni operations.
6. Diplomacy remains open: Pakistan has also backed discussing political engagement with Ansar Allah, preserving a possible negotiating track alongside collective military deterrence.

What happens next to the wider region?

1. Escalation threshold: The key threshold is whether Turkish and Pakistani forces remain defensive inside Saudi Arabia or become directly involved in Yemen.
2. Iran dimension: Ansar Allah receives Iranian support, but available evidence does not establish that Tehran directs every Houthi battlefield or targeting decision.
3. Dual-chokepoint risk: Instability at Bab al-Mandeb alongside disruption at Hormuz can pressure oil flows, shipping costs, insurance and wider regional trade.
4. Saudi security shift: Operationalising the Makkah pact gives Riyadh a new regional defence mechanism as confidence in traditional external protection faces strain.
5. Humanitarian cost: The UN migration agency says renewed fighting has displaced about 184,000 people, adding another destabilising layer to Yemen’s crisis.
6. What determines next phase: Watch Taiz, Mocha, Bab al-Mandeb shipping, Saudi infrastructure attacks and Turkish-Pakistani deployment details to judge whether escalation spreads.

Conclusion

Ansar Allah’s September gains exposed two realities: the movement can still exploit Yemen’s fragmented opposition, and Saudi Arabia remains vulnerable to pressure from missiles, drones and maritime disruption.

The counteroffensive has reversed important coastal gains, but control around Mocha and Taiz remains contested and the Houthis retain strike options beyond the shoreline. Activation of the Makkah pact strengthens Saudi defence by bringing Türkiye and Pakistan into a formal collective framework, without yet making them combatants inside Yemen.

The decisive question is whether this new deterrence contains the conflict. Failure could connect Yemen more tightly to the Iran confrontation, threaten two major maritime chokepoints and deepen an already severe humanitarian crisis.

Value addition

Glossary and related terms

Ansar Allah

The movement at the centre of this session’s Yemen conflict analysis. The presentation describes it as controlling Sanaa and much of Yemen’s populous northwest and as the force behind the September offensive.

Houthis

The term used interchangeably with Ansar Allah in several slides, especially when discussing missile, drone and coastal military activity.

Bab al-Mandeb

The maritime chokepoint beside Yemen that became central to the session after Ansar Allah’s advance reached nearby Hanish and Perim islands and the subsequent government counterattack focused on its northern approaches.

Mocha

A Red Sea coastal location highlighted in both the September advance and the Saudi-backed counteroffensive. The session says control around Mocha remains contested.

Taiz

A key Yemeni front discussed in the presentation. The September advance increased pressure around Taiz and the session identifies the Taiz front as one of the indicators to watch next.

Turbah

A location near Taiz cited in the session as part of the routes where Ansar Allah’s advance increased pressure on government-held areas.

Hanish Islands

Red Sea islands reached during the September advance, placing Ansar Allah forces closer to the Bab al-Mandeb shipping chokepoint.

Perim Island

An island beside Bab al-Mandeb identified in the session as one of the positions reached during Ansar Allah’s September offensive.

Dhubab

A southwest Yemen location that government forces said they recaptured during the October counteroffensive, including its airstrip.

Maritime chokepoint

A narrow sea passage whose disruption can affect shipping and trade. The session focuses on Bab al-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz as two connected strategic pressure points.

Strait of Hormuz

The Gulf shipping chokepoint discussed alongside Bab al-Mandeb. The presentation argues that simultaneous disruption at both passages could reduce Saudi export flexibility and raise wider trade pressures.

East-West Pipeline

A Saudi oil route identified in the session as an important alternative when Gulf shipping is constrained and as infrastructure previously exposed to Houthi attack.

Makkah Joint Defence Agreement (JDA)

The trilateral defence framework described in the session as having been signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August 2026 and activated in practical terms on 5 October.

Collective defence

The principle, described in the presentation’s JDA section, that an armed attack on one member is treated as an attack on all members.

Strategic Political and Defence Committee

The decision-making mechanism described in the session for implementing the trilateral defence arrangement, involving foreign ministers, defence ministers and military chiefs.

Rapid deployment

The movement of agreed military forces and capabilities on an accelerated basis. The session says the JDA activation authorised rapid deployment inside Saudi Arabia under approved arrangements.

Deterrence

The attempt to prevent escalation by making the expected costs or risks of attack unacceptable. The presentation asks whether the newly activated regional defence framework can contain the conflict.

National Resistance

One of the anti-Houthi military formations named in the session’s discussion of Yemen’s fragmented command structure.

Giants Brigades

One of the military formations identified in the presentation as operating within the broader anti-Houthi camp through a distinct command structure.

National Shield

Another force named in the presentation’s explanation of the multiple commands and loyalties within the anti-Houthi coalition.

Southern separatist ambitions

The political objective discussed as one of Yemen’s three fractures, reflecting disagreement inside the anti-Houthi camp over whether Yemen should remain unified.

Saudi-led coalition

The Saudi-backed military framework referenced in the counterattack section, including the coalition’s statement about the scale of aircraft participating at daybreak.

Drone attack

An unmanned aerial strike method repeatedly referenced in the session in relation to attacks on Saudi infrastructure, maritime threats and air-defence responsibilities.

Iran dimension

The regional layer created by Iranian support for Ansar Allah. The presentation explicitly cautions that available evidence does not establish that Tehran directs every Houthi battlefield or targeting decision.

Humanitarian displacement

The forced movement of civilians because of conflict. The session cites about 184,000 people displaced by renewed fighting as a key humanitarian indicator.

Internationally recognised government

The Yemeni government described in the presentation as holding areas farther south and east and as launching the Saudi-backed counteroffensive on 4 October.